I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration law allies long have worried about the fairness of immigra tion law enforcement. These concerns include whether the government pro vides adequate process in immigration law removal adjudication 1 and
Without counsel, individuals feel the full weight of government power with little to lean on. One example of a rulemaking concern is that immigration law relies heavily on guidance documents, which provide less stability and transparency than another type of agency rulemaking. 4 It is doubtful that a foreign national would know to look for an agency guidance document, let alone understand its legal significance. 5 Immigration law allies also have separation of powers concerns. 6 The role of the judiciary is often weak in immigration law, and the enforcement of im migration law often involves inter-agency combination of functions and the use of agency adjudicators with very little decisional independence. For example, an employee of the Department of Justice adjudicates whether a foreign national will be removed from the United States. This employee, called an immigration judge, lacks the job protections provided to other fed eral agency adjudicators in other areas of administrative law. 7 The lawyer pursuing removal on behalf of the government is an employee of the Department of Homeland Security. The foreign national, again, often has no lawyer. Congress has limited judicial review over immigration agency
The existence of administrative agencies has long provoked critiques. The Administrative Procedure Act 11 ("APA") itself was enacted as a reaction to concerns about the potential power of administrative agencies. 12 The Supreme Court has decided many cases addressing the constitutionality of agency behavior. 13 Despite that the mainstream consensus is that federal administrative law is legitimate, there are administrative law scholars and advocates who still call for its demise. 15 To them, critiques and restrictions on the power of administrative agencies are steps toward the destruction of, or at least a sub stantial weakening of, the administrative state. Others question and seek to reform the power of administrative agencies without explicitly seeking the total demise of administrative law, but out of skepticism about federal power generally. 16 The path is incremental; moving toward a weakened administra tive state is preferred. 17 This article refers to both groups as "administrative law adversaries." 13. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (concluding that agency adjudication of a state law counterclaim did not violate the Article III judicial power); Whitman v. American Trucking Assoc., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (determining that "requisite to protect the public health" is an intelligible principle and therefore a constitutional delegation of congressional power).
14.
15. See discussion infra Part II. 16. See discussion infra Part II. 17. See discussion infra Part II. 18. Gillian Metzger has described some recent criticisms of the administrative state as "contempo rary anti-administrativism." Metzger, supra note 10, at 4. Under that umbrella falls "conservative and libertarian challenges to administrative governance," and "more moderate interventions." Id. at 8, 32. These include political, judicial and academic challenges. See generally id. at 9-12. The more moderate interventions include academic arguments "pushing back at administrative governance more [Vol. 32:99 At times, concerns that motivate immigration law allies converge with those held by administrative law adversaries. 19 Before his confirmation as a Supreme Court justice, then Judge Neil Gorsuch wrote a concurrence in an immigration law appeal where he sided with an individual foreign national facing the strong power of federal administrative agencies. 20 In that case, the Board of Immigration Appeals, an administrative appellate body and a part of the Department of Justice, was able to change existing precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit. 21 Justice Gorsuch was concerned that the agency was able to change the rules in this way. 22 At his confirmation hearing, Justice Gorsuch described his concern:
[The circumstances of the case] reminded me of when Charlie Brown is going in to kick the ball, and Lucy picks it up at the last second, and that struck me as raising serious due process concerns, fair notice, and separation of powers concerns.
. . .
Can a man like Mr. Gutierrez [the foreign national], the least among us, be able to rely on judicial precedent on the books, or can have the ball picked up as he is going in for the kick? Many immigration law allies share Justice Gorsuch's concerns about a lack of fairness in immigration law adjudication. What this excerpt from his con firmation hearing does not reveal is that, as discussed in more detail below, Justice Gorsuch went further in his concurring opinion to raise questions about the underpinnings of administrative law generally. 24 Another example of the convergence is that immigration law allies and administrative law adversaries both probably would support a proposal to incrementally." Id. at 32. These incremental arguments are often rooted in administrative law as opposed to questions of legitimacy of the administrative state, which are often rooted in constitutional law argu ments. Id. Metzger recognizes that challenges to the administrative state are "diverse," but she identifies anti-administrativism's "core themes." Id. at 33. Those core themes are "rhetorical antipathy to adminis trative government," "an assertion of a greater role for the Article III courts," and a "heavy constitutional flavor" (including some reliance on the doctrine of Originalism). Id. at 35, 38, 42-43. At least one "anti administrativist" challenges the breadth of Professor Metzger's categorization. Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an "Anti-Administrativist," 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, at 2 (2017). For purposes of this arti cle, the exact categorization is not as important as recognizing that there are some whose interests may converge with immigration law allies but whose interests may diverge when it comes to ideas about agency regulation in general.
19 Adjudicators with more job security may be less likely to make decisions worried about what agency bosses may think. An administrative law adversary may see this proposal as ultimately unsatis factory, but as at least a stepping-stone toward reducing agency power. 26 If it is harder for agency bosses to fire adjudicators, then agency power has decreased. Immigration law allies may support the proposal as a means to improve the fairness of immigration law enforcement, and may not share the end goals or beliefs of the adversaries.
This article explores this convergence phenomenon, including examining the extent of the convergence. Examining efforts to discredit the Chevron 27 doctrine and to reimagine the rulemaking process shows how immigration law allies share some of the concerns of administrative law adversaries. Also, there are immigration law implications if these reforms take hold. In addition to considering immigration law implications, the broader consequences are important. Immigration law allies should be aware that some who are arguing against Chevron deference and that some who are arguing to add obligations to the rulemaking process are doing so because ultimately they prefer to weaken, if not destroy, the administrative state. What may be good for immi gration law in the short term may weaken administrative law principles in the long term.
28

II. EFFORTS TO WEAKEN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
This Part explains the Chevron doctrine and describes critiques of the doctrine promoted by administrative law adversaries. It also examines efforts to reform the rulemaking process. By focusing on the implications of Chevron and rulemaking reform for immigration law, the convergence of immigration law allies and administrative law adversaries comes into view. 28. Metzger, supra note 10, at 46-51 (acknowledging "a movement against national administrative government" and arguing that "some anti-administrative moves could prove quite significant" including that "contemporary anti-administrativism may serve to undercut the legitimacy of national administrative governance"); Sohoni, supra note 19, at 16 (referring to Supreme Court justices who have questioned administrative law power "as the mirror image and foil of those Lochner-era dissenters, who toiled so long and so assiduously until their point was won by a later and more fatal majority"). [Vol. 32:99 A. Questioning Chevron Deference
The Chevron Doctrine
Chevron deference refers to the type of respect a federal court should show to an agency's legal conclusions.
29 When Congress delegates tasks to an ex ecutive branch agency, the agency will need to interpret the statute Congress has charged it with implementing. 30 If a regulated party challenges an agency legal conclusion, federal courts do not review the agency's interpretation of the statute de novo.
31 Instead, courts defer to reasonable agency interpreta tions of ambiguous statutes.
32 If the statute is clear, then the court must give effect to the clear congressional meaning.
33
Statutes rarely contain definitions of every statutory term and agencies of ten resolve statutory ambiguities. In Chevron, the Supreme Court rejected an environmental group's challenge to President Reagan's Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of a term of the Clear Air Act. 34 An agency, like the EPA did in Chevron, may clarify a statutory term through notice and comment rulemaking. Notice and comment rulemaking is a proce dure under the APA that generally requires an agency to post notice of a pro posed rule, to accept comments from the public on the proposed rule, and then to issue a final rule after considering the public feedback. 35 Notice and comment rulemaking is a time intensive and expensive agency process.
36
To interpret a statute through notice and comment rulemaking, an agency posts notice of how it intends to interpret the statute, accepts public reac tion to that interpretation, and then announce its final interpretation. If after notice and comment rulemaking an agency adopts a clarification of an ambig uous statutory term that is reasonable, courts must defer to that reasonable interpretation, even if the court might prefer an alternative reasonable inter pretation. 37 Whether an interpretation is reasonable is a fairly low bar to meet. Generally speaking, for an agency interpretation to be unreasonable it must be arbitrary and capricious. 
IMMIGRATION LAW ADVERSARIES
Under Supreme Court precedent, certain agency legal conclusions are not entitled to Chevron deference. 39 According to the Supreme Court, agency legal conclusions are entitled to Chevron deference when "Congress dele gated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law" and when the agency legal conclusion at issue was made under that authority. 40 Notice and comment rulemaking generally is considered to meet these requirements. 41 More informal types of agency work-product, however, may not trigger Chevron deference.
42 "Major questions" with "deep eco nomic and political significance" also may be exempt. 43 In Chevron, the Supreme Court upheld a Republican administration's nar row interpretation of the Clean Air Act. It upheld a reasonable interpretation that decreased the reach of the act. The desirability of an agency's reasonable interpretation will vary depending on one's political and policy perspective. Republicans may have been less thrilled with outcomes when the doctrine called for deference to agency legal conclusions during the Obama administration. 44 See LIBERTY'S NEMESIS 368-69 (Dean Reuter & John Yoo eds., 2016). See also Metzger, supra note 10, at 15 ("Once Republican mainstays, Chevron deference and presidential administrative control quickly became the beˆtes noires of conservatives"); Christopher J. Walker, (Incrementally) Toward a More Libertarian Bureaucracy, LIBERTY L. BLOG (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty forum/incrementally-toward-a-more-libertarian-bureaucracy/ ("It is a bit ironic that right-of-center scholars and judges are attacking the Chevron deference doctrine that crystalized during the Reagan administration to allow for sweeping deregulatory executive actions.").
Since its introduction in 1984, Chevron deference has been the subject of much criticism and study. 45 Even with Supreme Court attempts to clarify some aspects of the doctrine, 46 the outcome of the Chevron analysis depends first on whether Chevron deference even applies, 47 and if it does, second on the unpredictable conclusion whether a court will find the statute to be ambig uous. 48 Courts will use canons of statutory interpretation to determine if a statute is clear. 49 If a court determines that a statute is ambiguous, then the agency conclusion of law is almost always reasonable. 50 One further complicating factor is the Supreme Court's decision in Brand X. 52 In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that if an agency legal conclusion deserves Chevron deference, the agency's reasonable interpretation of an am biguous statute may trump an existing federal court conclusion on the same question of law. 53 If a federal court interprets an ambiguous statute one rea sonable way, but then an agency later interprets the ambiguous statute another reasonable way, that same federal court must now abandon its own precedent and accede to the agency's reasonable interpretation. 
Chevron Criticism and Administrative Law Adversaries
Questioning the Chevron doctrine does not necessarily mean that one seeks the destruction of, or even substantial weakening of, the administrative state. Some recent criticisms of Chevron, however, are tied to broader efforts to weaken or destroy the power of administrative agencies. 55 Some who criticize Chevron are doing so because they see serious problems with the legal justifications for regulation by administrative agencies in general. 56 Justice Neil Gorsuch provided an example of this type of criticism of Chevron, as mentioned above. In the immigration law case discussed in his confirmation hearing, Brand X caused the Tenth Circuit to consider exactly when a Board of Immigration Appeals' statutory interpretation eliminated Tenth Circuit precedent on the same question of law. 57 The Tenth Circuit had resolved tension between two immigration statutes in 2005. 58 In 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals looked at the same statutory tension and resolved it in a different way. 59 Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit recognized that under the Supreme Court's decision in Brand X, the Tenth Circuit was required to defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals' reasonable resolution of the statutory tension, even though the Tenth Circuit first had resolved the tension differently. 60 The Tenth Circuit faced the question whether the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation would apply to someone who applied for a benefit af ter the Board announced its contrary interpretation but before the Tenth 
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Circuit recognized the effect of the agency interpretation under Brand X. 61 A three judge panel, including Justice Gorsuch, held that the Board's statutory interpretation did not take effect in the Tenth Circuit until the Tenth Circuit acknowledged it under Brand X.
62 If someone applied for an immigration benefit in the period after the Board announced its legal conclusion, but before the Tenth Circuit acknowledged its knock-out effect under Brand X, the application must be adjudicated under the Tenth Circuit's legal conclusion.
63
Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion in the case that explained his objections to Chevron deference and his desire to implement de novo review of agency legal conclusions. While the Tenth Circuit decided the case under Chevron and its progeny, Justice Gorsuch's concerns about Chevron moti vated him to write a concurring opinion. Perceiving "an elephant in the room," 64 Justice Gorsuch argued that "the fact is Chevron and Brand X per mit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers' design." 65 Citing separation of powers principles as "a vital guard against govern mental encroachment on the people's liberties," Justice Gorsuch criticized Brand X as removing too much power from the neutral judiciary. 66 Because Brand X requires courts to "overrule their own declarations about the mean ing of existing law in favor of interpretations dictated by executive agencies," Justice Gorsuch concluded that Brand X shifted the balance of power too far toward the executive and away from the judiciary. 67 He objected to agency power to overrule court interpretations of law. To him, the proper recourse to overrule a court interpretation of law is to engage in the legislative process. 68 To the extent that Chevron helps to justify the rule in Brand X, Justice Gorsuch attacked the foundational principles of the Chevron doctrine.
69
Because Chevron allows agencies to resolve statutory ambiguity, Justice Gorsuch determined that "Chevron seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty." 70 Justice Gorsuch is not the only Supreme Court Justice to question defer ence to agencies. 72 Justice Thomas has expressed his doubts about the consti tutionality of courts deferring to agency interpretations of statutes. 73 Also, in a dissent in a Chevron deference case, Justice Roberts wrote that "[i]t would be a bit much to describe [the administrative state] as 'the very definition of tyranny,'" but he also stated that "the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed." 74 In that dissent, Justice Roberts envisioned a greater role for the courts. Additionally, Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito have questioned court deference to agency interpretations of the agency's own regulations. 75 Legislative reforms to judicial deference are being advanced as well, including proposals to eliminate Chevron deference. 76 Clearly, there is a trend amongst some to curtail judicial deference to administrative agencies. The idea of questioning the appropriate level of judicial deference to agency conclusions is not new. Such inquiry has been occurring since the enactment of the APA, if not before. 78 What is most relevant for this article is that some efforts to challenge judicial deference to agencies are tied to efforts to ques tion the legitimacy of administrative law or to shrink federal power by decreasing the power of agencies.
Justice Gorsuch's concurring opinion includes signs that he is skeptical of administrative law generally. In discussing whether congressional delegation is a justification for Chevron deference, he raised doubts about Congress' ability to delegate its authority to the executive branch in the first place. 79 Justice Gorsuch recognized that the Supreme Court has settled that Congress can delegate to administrative agencies as long as it provides an "intelligible principle." 80 He added, however: "Some thoughtful judges and scholars have questioned whether standards like these serve as much as a protection against the delegation of legislative authority as a license for it, undermining the sep aration between the legislative and executive powers that the founders 72. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 17-31 (discussing the judicial attack against the administrative state).
73. If administrative law is unlawful, then the status quo of administrative law is in doubt. In addressing arguments in favor of the lawful existence of administrative law, Professor Hamburger writes: "Whereas administrative law is deeply unlawful, the obstacles to accepting this conclusion are disturb ingly thin. . . . When raised in defense of this dangerous power, the supposed obstacles look like lame excuses for not facing up to the ugly reality." 92 Part of Professor Hamburger's critique involves deference. He classifies judicial deference to agency interpretation as "an abandonment of judicial office."
93 For Professor Hamburger, judicial deference to agency legal con clusions is "particularly striking" because "judges have a distinctive authority to expound the law." 94 He concludes that because the constitution establishes judges as interpreters of the law, it is "puzzling" that a judge would defer to an agency, "unless the administrators enjoy a power above the law." Professor Lawson deter mined that "the modern administrative state openly flouts almost every important structural precept of the American constitutional order." 97 In sup port of his argument, Professor Lawson emphasized how agencies exercise a combination of legislative, executive and judicial functions. As an example, he described how the Federal Trade Commission promulgates rules, investi gates potential violations of those rules, decides whether to begin an enforce ment action, and then itself adjudicates whether there has been a violation of those rules. 103 He has recommended a course of action to "disable and hobble" the administrative state.
104 As a part of that effort, he recommends increasing the role of courts in reviewing agency decisions. He would abandon Chevron deference.
105
Criticism of Chevron is not by definition an attack against the legitimacy of administrative law.
106
At Justice Gorsuch's confirmation hearing, Senator Orrin Hatch said, "I'm troubled by the sug gestion that skepticism of Chevron, the Chevron case, somehow means that one is somehow reflexively opposed to regulation. In my mind, such a charge is completely unfounded." Gorsuch Confirmation Hearing, Day 2, Part 1, C-SPAN (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?425138-1/supreme court-nominee-stresses-independence-calls-criticism-judges-disheartening&start=3896.
For some, however, Chevron reform is a piece of a larger project to delegitimize. Professors Hamburger, Lawson and Yoo are examples of this type of effort.
There are other administrative law adversaries who seek major reforms, which may or may not include reform to Chevron, but who have not explic itly questioned the legitimacy of administrative law. These adversaries seem to be motivated by a desire to decrease the overall power of the federal gov ernment.
107 Arguably these scholars fall on the continuum towards those who outright question the legitimacy of the administrative state.
108 For example, Professor Kent Barnett has described bias challenges against administrative judges (as compared to Administrative Law Judges) as a promising "first step" in attacking administrative law more generally.
109 Professor Chris 100. Id. at 1544. 101. Id. at 1545. 102. LIBERTY'S NEMESIS, supra note 44, at 370 ("Now constitutional doctrine must aim at liberty's nemesis-administrative agencies."). In the same collection of essays, Dean Reuter described his obser vation that as federal power increases, individual liberty decreases. Id. at 4. See also D.A. Candeub, Tyranny and Administrative Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 93 (2017) (describing defenders of the administra tive state as "argu[ing] for an elected dictator" and arguing that that because the administrative state con flicts with the Constitutional understanding of separation of powers, the framers would see it as "tyrannical and illegitimate").
103. LIBERTY'S NEMESIS, supra note 44, at 367. 104. Id. at 369 ("Rather than make the administrative state more efficient and effective, perhaps the better answer is to disable and hobble it.").
105. Id.
106.
107. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 33 (describing the academic attack against the administrative state as "part of a wider and decades-old effort to reset constitutional law in a conservative and libertarian direction, reflected in the work of conservative legal groups like the Federalist Society and the Institute for Justice"); Brian Beutler, The Rehabilitationists, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 30, 2015) (describing libertar ian efforts to rehabilitate Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) , and decrease our acceptance of the overall boundaries of the power of the federal government).
108. Metzger distinguishes between those who seek incremental reform through challenges based in administrative law and those who seek to delegitimize the administrative state through constitutional law arguments. Both groups, however, fall under her "anti-administrativist" label. See supra note 18.
109. Barnett, supra note 26, at 1035. [Vol. 32:99
Walker has advocated for reforms that move toward a more libertarian administrative state.
110
Others find fault with Chevron but do not question the legitimacy of the administrative state or question federal power.
111 For example, Professor Jack Beerman has argued that Chevron violates the APA and that it raises separation of powers problems.
112 His suggestions for reform are motivated by a desire to remain true to the foundation of the administrative state, the APA. 113 His argument does not question the legitimacy of administrative law.
The debate over judicial deference to agency legal conclusions has reper cussions for immigration law, as discussed below. Immigration law allies have concerns about Chevron deference as well. 114 Immigration law allies should think about Chevron using a wider lens beyond just its implications for immigration law. Chevron is not sacrosanct, and reforms to Chevron are not necessarily the death knell of administrative law. Immigration law allies, however, should keep in mind that some arguing against Chevron do so as a part of a larger project to weaken administrative law.
B. Burdening the Regulatory Process
The APA dictates how agencies may make rules. 115 The most intensive method, formal rulemaking, is rarely used. It involves public hearings. 116 The next most intensive is notice and comment rulemaking. 117 The least intensive is the use of guidance documents. 118 Efforts to reform the APA's 110. Walker, supra note 44 (responding to calls to drastically weaken the administrative state by sug gesting "a number of incremental and . . . more realistic reforms that would move us toward a more liber tarian administrative state"). Chevron not for being so strong as to destroy America's moral underpinnings and consti tutional order, but instead for being so weak that it cannot be worth all the legal trouble it creates").
112. Beerman, supra note 111, at 782-84. 113. Beerman, supra note 111, at 788-94. See Metzger, supra note 10, at 33-34 (discussing criticisms made by "scholars committed to the administrative project").
114. See infra Part II(C 
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rulemaking provisions come from across the ideological spectrum. 119 Some proposed reforms would make it harder for agencies to create rules. For example, some reforms would require greater use of public hearings.
120 Such reform fits with a perspective that administrative agency power needs to be curtailed. If it takes more time and energy to regulate and the pot of agency resources does not grow, the result is a weakened administrative state.
Agencies use the notice and comment process more than formal rulemak ing to promulgate rules. 121 As described above, under notice and comment rulemaking, agencies issue a notice of proposed rulemaking and then accept public comment on the proposed rule for a period of time. After considering the public comment, the agency then releases a final rule. The APA itself con tains some limited direction as to how agencies should undertake this process.
122
The APA contains exemptions to notice and comment rulemaking.
123
Under these exemptions, an agency can avoid the requirements for notice before it acts and for public comment before it acts. 124 An agency rule that is the product of shortened procedures, however, may not have the force of law and may not be entitled to Chevron deference. If an agency rule does not have the force of law, then a regulated party is free to argue during any enforcement proceeding that a different rule should apply. 125 Guidance documents are an exemption from notice and comment rulemak ing.
126 Through a guidance document, agencies transmit information to the public about how they plan to enforce statutory law and its own regulations. An agency simply issues a guidance document, which is often in the form of a memorandum from a high-ranking agency official. 127 It instructs lowerlevel agency officials of the agency's priorities and plans when it comes to certain enforcement issues. Agency guidance documents are not legally bind ing, however.
128 Regulated parties must be free to argue for a different approach than that contained in the guidance document.
Reform proposals aim to add procedural burdens to the notice and com ment rulemaking process and to the use of guidance documents. The general theme is that it would be harder for agencies to make rules. These proposals stem from a belief that agencies need to be restricted. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Regulatory Accountability Act in January 2017. 129 The bill would, among other things, create new rulemaking hurdles for certain categories of rules. 130 The House version of the Regulatory Accountability Act is a part of H.R. 5, a compendium of administrative law reform bills. For discussion of the other aspects of House Bill, H.R. 5, see House Congressional Record, https://congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5 (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
Under the House bill, an agency would have to: (1) give notice that it will initiate notice and comment rulemaking (pre-notice of the notice required under the current APA) for a "major rule," a "high-impact rule," a "negative-impact on jobs and wages rule," or a "rule that involves a novel legal or policy issue arising out of statutory mandates" 131 and (2) provide an actual hearing before adop tion of high impact rules.
132
This bill would import the formal rulemaking requirement of a live public hearing for "high impact rules." The bill imagines a public hearing featuring cross-examination and inquiry into the agency's factual conclusions.
133 This includes considering whether there is a lower cost alternative that the agency should adopt. 134 These proposals would slow down the rulemaking process, assuming that agencies are not appropriated substantial additional sums to carry out agency operations.
135
The House Regulatory Accountability Act also would impose additional requirements on guidance documents. 136 For example, the act would import some notice and comment rulemaking requirements to guidance documents, such as requiring cost-benefit analysis for major guidance. 137 Major guidance is guidance that "is likely to lead to:" (1) "an annual cost on the economy of $100,000,000 or more;" (2) "a major increase in costs or prices;" (3) "signifi cant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, 129. H.R. 5, 115th Cong. § 103 (2017). There are other legislative proposals that would affect rulemaking. See Metzger, supra note at 10, at 11-13. 130.
H.R. 5 § 103(c) (2017)
. Under the bill, "major rules" include rules with "an annual cost on the economy of $100,000,000 or more," rules that will cause "a major increase in costs or prices," rules that will cause "significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innova tion," and rules with "significant impacts on multiple sectors of the economy." See id. § 102. A "high impact rule" is one that is "likely to impose an annual cost on the economy of $1,000,000,000 or more." Id. A "negative impact on jobs and wages rule" is one that, among other things, "reduce[s] employment [or wages] not related to new regulatory compliance by 1 percent or more annually during the 1-year, 5 year, or 10-year period after implementation." Id. For these three types of rules (and for rules falling under the novel legal or policy issue category), agencies would need to provide at least 90 days'notice that the agency will publish the notice of proposed rulemaking. Id. § 103(c). The advanced notice must include a description of the problem, information about data and evidence the agency expects to rely on, and an explanation of the agency's thinking on the issue. Id. The agency must solicit data, views and arguments and provide at least 60 days of public comment. After the advance notice process is complete, then the agency would still need to publish the regular notice of proposed rulemaking and continue the APA process. Id.
132 
The center explains:
These types of hearings were all but dispensed with several decades ago because they were impracticable, wasteful, burdensome, and resulted in lengthy delays of pending rules. Ordinary Americans and small business will lack the resources to participate meaningfully in these "public hearings." Instead, they will be dominated by wellresourced corporate special interests. . . . The expense of conducting these "public hearings" will limit agencies' ability to carry out their statutory missions, especially at a time when agencies face severe resource shortfalls.
141
The organization has similar objections to other parts of the bill. A critical theme is that the bill would add unnecessary obligations to the rulemaking process without providing additional resources such that the whole process could grind to a halt, resulting in a diminished capacity to regulate private business.
142
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has described its support of the Regulatory Accountability Act in terms of making it harder to regulate. In a document called "Taming the Administrative State," the U.S. Chamber of Commerce acknowledges a desire to "rein in the regulatory beast," and that "frustrations with the administrative state are well justified." 144 The report proposes that "all regulations are not equal."
145 Some are acceptable, as they "keep society functioning" and some "protect health and safety." 146 Efforts to reform the rulemaking process are sometimes tied to efforts to restrict agency power in general. Administrative law adversaries may support bills like the Regulatory Accountability Act because of its promise to put additional hurdles in front of agency action. For purposes of this article, it does not matter whether the appeal of such reforms satisfies a desire for less federal power or a belief that administrative agencies should not exist at all. What does matter is that debates about rulemaking reform in immigration law are implicated in this larger debate about agency power. As with efforts to eliminate Chevron deference, immigration law allies should consider how rulemaking reforms in immigration law are mixed up with debates over agency power in general. Administrative law adversaries should consider how proposed reforms will effect immigration law.
C. Immigration Law Implications
The debates about Chevron deference and agency rulemaking manifest in immigration law. This section describes how and examines potential reper cussions of deference and rulemaking reform in immigration law.
Eliminating Chevron Deference
Chevron deference is operative in immigration law. The question of when Chevron deference applies has even more layers of complexity than in other areas of administrative law. At times Chevron applies just as we expect, given that immigration law is a type of administrative law. 148 When Chevron operates unexceptionally in immigration law, a court will defer to a reasona ble interpretation of an ambiguous immigration statute. A federal court may determine the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") to be ambiguous and defer to the Board of Immigration Appeals' reasonable interpretation of that statute.
149 Or a federal court may find that the INA is clear and that the Board's interpretation runs afoul of that unambiguous interpretation. 150 If that happens, then the court would enforce Congress' clear intent as expressed in the statute. Sometimes, however, immigration cases seem to be treated dif ferently. Chevron's way. The Rule of Lenity states that in immigration law, any statu tory ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the foreign national. 152 The Rule of Lenity seems to undercut Chevron deference because it could override a reasonable agency interpretation that resolves statutory ambiguity against a foreign national. As discussed below, it is not clear when the Rule of Lenity applies instead of Chevron deference.
Because various federal agencies implement immigration law and interpret the INA, various agencies could be due Chevron deference. The Board of Immigration Appeals interprets the INA through informal adjudication con ducted by attorney-employees of the Department of Justice. 153 It is an admin istrative appellate body that hears appeals from decisions of immigration judges. 154 The Board is mostly, but not exclusively, concerned with the re moval aspects of the INA. 155 United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") interprets the INA as a part of its mission to administer immigration benefits.
156 USCIS, for example, issues guidance documents or engages in notice and comment rulemaking to communicate its interpreta tions of the parts of the INA that implicate affirmative applications for legal status.
157 USCIS is a part of the Department of Homeland Security. It uses a combination of rulemaking and paper-based informal adjudication to carry out its functions. Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement are two additional units within the Department of Homeland Security with immigration law responsibilities. The Department of Labor and the Department of State also play roles in the implementation of immigration law. 158 If Chevron deference were abandoned and courts review all of these agencies' legal conclusions de novo, that would not lead to any guaranteed results either pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant. In some circumstances, a restrictionist agency legal conclusion may be discarded upon judicial review. In other circumstances, the opposite might happen; the reviewing court may narrow an accommodating agency legal conclusion. The tenor of statutory interpretation challenges would change, however, as parties would be free to argue outside the confines of the Chevron presumption that reasonable agency legal conclusions must be upheld. What is less clear is how courts would actually use their de novo review. Would there be some kind of defer ence practiced, even if courts claim to not show deference? Of course, all of this is premised on the idea that what kind of deference the court says it is using actually matters to outcomes. At the Supreme Court level, there is evi dence it does not. 159 At the courts of appeals, there is evidence that it does. 160 If Chevron deference were abandoned and the Rule of Lenity were not, that would solidify that deference is due in immigration cases to interpreta tions that favor foreign nationals. In 2017, the Supreme Court avoided decid ing whether Chevron would receive priority over the Rule of Lenity. 161 The Court explained that it did not need to resolve that question because "the stat ute, read in context, unambiguously forecloses the [immigration agency's] interpretation." 162 Presumably, because the immigration agency's interpreta tion would have failed Chevron because it went against congressional intent, the Court did not need to decide whether Chevron should apply at all. If Chevron deference no longer exists, it would be clear that the Rule of Lenity prevails.
Further complicating predictions about post-Chevron immigration law is the plenary power doctrine. The plenary power doctrine still looms large in immigration law. 163 This 19 th century Supreme Court doctrine proclaims that courts should show special restraint in reviewing congressional policy choices in immigration law. 164 For example, Congress has wide authority to decide who may legally enter the country, subject only to a "facially legiti mate and bona fide" standard of review." 165 While returning lawful perma nent residents (those with a green card) may have constitutional rights, the plenary power doctrine gives little protection to first time applicants outside of the United States who are asking for permission to enter. 166 In a postChevron world, the existence of the plenary power doctrine might be a reason to continue to apply the Rule of Lenity. If the government has so much power, then statutory ambiguities might rightly be decided in favor of the foreign national. However, courts might also develop a different kind of postChevron immigration law deference influenced by the plenary power doc trine. Without Chevron, courts might determine that the best way to give affect to the plenary power doctrine is to show deference to agency legal con clusions in immigration law, even if courts are no longer deferring to agency legal conclusions in other contexts.
Predictions about a post-Chevron immigration law also must take into con sideration that Congress has enacted restrictions on judicial review of agency action in immigration law. 167 Rather than strictly following the judicial review provisions of the APA, 168 Congress has carved out special rules for immigration law. There is no judicial review of most agency discretionary actions and of conclusions of fact. 169 Judicial review of agency conclusions of law still exists. At first glance these restrictions on judicial review might not seem to affect any discussion about Chevron because judicial review of conclusions of law remain. However, judicial review of agency conclusions of law still exists mostly as a concession to the difficult constitutional ques tions that would result if Congress eliminated all review of questions of law (including habeas review).
170 If a post-Chevron world results in statutory interpretations that are consistently pro-immigrant, Congress could decide to force the constitutional issue and attempt to eliminate judicial review of ques tions of law.
There is no guarantee that courts would review agency immigration legal conclusions de novo in a post-Chevron world. Even if they did, it is hard to predict exactly what that might mean for immigration law. Courts may create a type of plenary power deference in immigration cases. Or they may apply the Rule of Lenity. Or the plenary power doctrine may be overturned, 172. In a study of the use of Chevron deference in the federal courts of appeals, Professor Kent Barnett and Christopher Walker found that courts used Chevron deference 72.7% of the time when reviewing immigration agency decisions. Barnett and Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, supra note 160, at tbl.3. That percentage ranked the immigration agencies eighteenth out of the 28 agencies studied in terms of the percentage of cases in which the courts used Chevron deference (as supposed to some other level of deference or no deference). That means that courts used Chevron deference less frequently for the decisions of 10 other agencies, but relied on Chevron deference more frequently for 17 other agencies. Immigration is tied to less frequent use of Chevron deference, but is not completely out of the mainstream.
immigration questions of law just like any other agency legal conclusion. The post-Chevron state of review of agency immigration legal conclusions is unclear.
Regulatory Reform
The effect of increased regulatory burdens on immigration law is clearer. Increased regulatory burdens would be detrimental to immigration law, espe cially to USCIS. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals functions mostly through individual adjudication, increased notice and comment rulemaking requirements would not have as substantial an effect as at USCIS. Notice and comment rulemaking at USCIS is already a time-and labor-intensive ac tivity. 174 There are already substantial procedural obligations that USCIS undertakes before it issues a notice of proposed rulemaking. Also, immigra tion rulemaking can require the coordination of USCIS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol, the Department of State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice. It can be difficult to obtain consensus. 175 Adding additional procedural requirements would make the process even more cumbersome. USCIS already does not produce enough notice and comment regulations. Adding on an additional requirement to issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and perhaps a require ment to hold an evidentiary hearing would hinder the process even more.
The burdens and delays of notice and comment rulemaking can lead an agency to rely more on guidance documents because they are less procedur ally burdensome. Guidance documents are problematic already, 176 but legal reform efforts like the Regulatory Accountability Act carry a dramatic onetwo punch. The first punch is that notice and comment rulemaking becomes even more difficult. 177 An agency may turn to rely on guidance documents even more as the only available method to communicate effectively with regulated parties. The second punch is the restrictions on the use of guidance 173.
174. Family, Administrative Law through the Lens of Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 598-99. The pre-publication steps are:
(1) USCIS leadership meets regularly to prioritize rules and decide on whether to initiate new rulemakings; (2) Subject matter experts at USCIS draft rules, engaging all interested offices within the agency; (3) Rulemaking teams (including economists, privacy specialists, etc.) develop and draft associ ated rulemaking documents, such as economic evaluations, privacy documents, and Paperwork Reduction Act materials; (4) USCIS often holds public stakeholder meetings to obtain views from the public, consistent with Executive Order 13563; (4) During the development process for a rulemaking, USCIS may engage with other components within DHS or with other federal agencies; (5) There is a clearance process at USCIS and DHS for leadership to approve rulemakings; (6) For regulatory actions that are "significant" under Executive Order 12866, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has up to 90 days to review the regulatory action.
Id. documents. Agencies will be forced to be creative and come up with even more informal methods of communicating with regulated parties, or might simply communicate less. Lack of communication is entirely possible, espe cially if agencies are not given additional funds to comply with increased pro cedural burdens.
178 Agencies certainly will have to focus rulemaking priorities even more sharply.
If notice and comment rulemaking becomes even more difficult, it will be harder to solve immigration law's overreliance on agency guidance docu ments. Many fundamental immigration law policies are contained in guid ance documents, and not in legally binding rules. 179 Harder to achieve notice and comment rulemaking, especially combined with more stringent require ments on the issuance of new guidance documents, will likely freeze in place those guidance documents that already exist. While that could result in some lingering pro-immigrant policies, it would not solve the problem that those policies are not legally binding rules. Immigration lawyers perceive and treat guidance documents as legally binding the agency, but they do not.
180 USCIS will continue to adjudicate applications for benefits, but the process will be less transparent and less consistent with fewer notice and comment rules and fewer guidance documents.
The introduction of new requirements for "major rules" and "high impact" rules would raise questions about how to measure the effect of immigration regulation. If "high impact rules" are rules that are "likely to impose an an nual cost on the economy of $1,000,000,000 or more," 181 then the impact of any immigration rule will need to be calculated. Calculating the cost of a par ticular immigration rule will be difficult and controversial. It is possible that many immigration rules will not impose that kind of cost. If that happens, then immigration rulemaking would not be subject to the proposed formal hearing requirement. The definition created for "major rules" leaves more room for including immigration rules. "Major rules" includes rules with "an annual cost on the economy of $100,000,000 or more," rules that will cause "a major increase in costs or prices," rules that will cause "significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation," and rules with "significant impacts on multiple sectors of the economy."
182 If immigration rules are classified as major rules, then the immigration agencies will face the added procedural requirement of issuing an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking.
Reforms to the rulemaking process could place additional hurdles in the path of USCIS. This would lead to fewer notice and comment rules and per haps less communication from the agency to stakeholders. 185 These concerns are in addition to the argument that the Rule of Lenity should apply instead of Chevron.
In raising concerns about Chevron, the interests of immigration law allies may converge with efforts to eliminate Chevron. Allies should continue to make these arguments. They should also consider, however, how these arguments may affect the larger conversation about administrative agency power. Additionally, they should consider whether broader questions about agency power influence their own conception of power in immigration law. Should regulatory power be the same across administrative agen cies?
186 Or is there something exceptional about immigration law that requires special safeguards? As far as rulemaking reform, in a previous article I argued that USCIS should use more notice and comment rulemaking, instead of guidance docu ments, and that it should establish its own Good Guidance Practices to set more transparent and stable rules about how it will use guidance docu ments. 188 These arguments do not assert that USCIS does not have the power to use guidance documents, nor do they assert any challenge to Congress' ability to delegate authority to USCIS. Instead, these are arguments about improving the administration of immigration law. Administrative law adver saries might support these arguments, but may be willing to go much further in curtailing agency power in this context.
In terms of adjudication, a variety of serious concerns exist surrounding the Department of Justice's adjudication of removal cases. The immigration courts face an absurd backlog of over 600,000 cases. The quality of deci sion-making leaves much to be desired at times. 190 The adjudicators lack decisional independence. 191 Because foreign nationals in removal proceed ings generally have no right to a government-funded attorney, about 40 per cent proceed without an attorney. In fact, the National Association of Immigration Judges itself has argued for some of these reforms. 200 Publications, National Association of Immigration Judges, https://www.naij-usa.org/ publications (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
The organization is not also arguing that their work is illegitimate.
Recent efforts and controversies surrounding the immigration agencies' use of prosecutorial discretion also do not necessarily implicate a challenge to the legitimacy of the administrative state. Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia called for greater transparency and predictability in the use of prose cutorial discretion in immigration law. 201 Prosecutorial discretion in immi gration law concerns efforts to prioritize enforcement resources, including deciding what characteristics make someone a high priority for removal. Or would the power to regulate immigration stay with the federal government?
Immigration law allies occupy a unique vantage point to approach the lat est efforts of administrative law adversaries to weaken or reform the adminis trative state. The convergence allows immigration law allies insight into the concerns that motivate administrative law adversaries. Likewise, the conver gence allows administrative law adversaries to understand allies' concerns about the treatment of foreign nationals. The convergence appears to be lim ited, but its breadth ultimately will be determined by the allies and adversa ries themselves. Immigration law allies should consider whether they are also administrative law adversaries, and administrative law adversaries need to clarify how immigration law fits into their efforts to safeguard against federal power.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legitimacy of administrative law and the proper scope of agency power are old topics. Efforts to challenge the administrative state or to imple ment major reform seem to have gained new urgency. There are intersections between efforts to weaken the administrative state and efforts to improve fair ness in immigration law. Many of the arguments to improve immigration law point out that the balance of power is heavily tilted toward administrative agencies in immigration law. Those who seek to diminish federal power or to delegitimize administrative law may welcome arguments in immigration law that decrease government power.
Efforts to increase fairness in immigration law, however, do not automati cally equate to efforts to challenge the legitimacy of federal power, or to enact major administrative law reform. Thus while the efforts of immigration law allies and administrative law adversaries may converge, they may not all share end goals. As debates over the future of administrative law continue, it is important to consider how potential reforms might improve the administra tion of immigration law. Reforms to immigration law, however, must also be viewed in the context of the future of administrative law.
